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Why did domestic anticommunism convulse the United States during the early 
Cold War but barely cause a ripple in the United Kingdom? Contemporaries and 
historians have puzzled over the dramatic difference in domestic politics between 
the USA and the UK, given the two countries’ broad alignment on foreign policy 
toward Communism and the Soviet Union in that era. Making sense of British and 
American anticommunism requires an understanding of their pre-Cold War origins. 
One factor that has received little attention is the role that trade unions played in 
shaping the distinctive character of domestic anticommunism in each country. 
Decades before Winston Churchill warned of an Iron Curtain, trade union leaders in 
London and Washington contended with significant communist movements within 
their ranks and developed their own discourses of communist infiltration and 
subversion. “Unions are alive to the communist menace,” said the secretary of 
Britain’s Trades Union Congress in 1928, echoing the American Federation of 
Labor’s 1925 denunciations of “communist trickery” and attempts to “overthrow the 
bona fide labor movement.”1 
                                                        
 
1 Walter M. Citrine, Democracy or Disruption? An Examination of Communist 
Influences in the Trades Unions (London 1928), 28, 4; Proceedings of the Forty-fifth 
Convention of the American Federation of Labor (1925), 91.  
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Mobilizing the working class was, after all, the overarching goal of communist 
parties everywhere, and union halls were the sites of sustained communist 
organizing. Thousands of union members and leaders debated communism, 
socialism, and democracy, and they produced uniquely laborist analyses and 
critiques of communism. But these debates played out very differently across the 
Atlantic. Comparing early British and American labor anticommunism reveals much 
about the trajectories that produced McCarthyism in the USA but not its analog in 
the UK. In Britain, socialist Trades Union Congress (TUC) leaders championed the 
Soviet Union from its inception and sought to sustain the “workers republic,” and 
while they spurned communism at home, the TUC largely tolerated its red members. 
In the USA, by contrast, conservative trade unionists in the American Federation of 
Labor (AFL) deplored both the Soviet Union and homegrown communist 
movements. AFL leaders evangelized about the evils of Communism, not only to 
union members, but also to Congress and the American public, becoming a powerful 
anticommunist lobby and a leading authority on the CPUSA. In 1935, liberal 
unionists created the Committee for Industrial Organization, which formed a 
political counterweight to the AFL, but this bloc also contained strong 
anticommunist tendencies that only strengthened over time.2 
The consequences of these differences became apparent after World War II. In 
both countries the labor movement had become increasingly embedded in the polity 
in the interwar years, via the New Deal in the USA and the growing strength of the 
Labour Party in the UK. The election of a Labour government in 1945 elevated TUC 
                                                        
2 The CIO changed its name to the Congress of Industrial Organizations in 1938. 
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leaders to the Cabinet. The Labour government approached domestic communism 
much as interwar labor leaders had done: as a political movement to be opposed 
rather than a conspiracy to be unmasked. The leadership of the TUC and the Labour 
Party periodically disagreed on policy matters, especially when Labour was in 
government, but relations between the unions and the party were always close, and 
on matters relating to communism, there was little light between them.3 Meanwhile 
American unionists remained on the political sidelines, more lobbyists than state 
actors. But the practices that anticommunist American trade unionists helped 
perfect—identifying clandestine communists, exposing them at dramatic 
Congressional hearings, and strategically red-baiting vulnerable enemies—became 
characteristic of the Cold War years. Comparison casts the unusual character of 
American labor anticommunists in sharp relief. In Britain, labor anticommunism 
operated within the mainstream of British politics, while in the USA, labor 
anticommunists played an outsized but underappreciated role in constructing the 
political culture and legal regime of postwar domestic anticommunism and 
McCarthyism. 
In this essay, I sketch the broad outlines of Anglo-American labor 
anticommunism to show the evolution of anticommunist sentiment and practice 
within each labor movement from 1920 through the early years of the Cold War. I 
focus on the American Federation of Labor and the British Trades Union Congress, 
the national labor organizations that coordinated labor politics within their 
                                                        
3 On the relationship between the TUC and the Labour Party, see Lewis Minkin, The 
Contentious Alliance: Trade Unions and the Labour Party (Edinburgh, 1991); Hugh 
Clegg, A History of British Trade Unions since 1889, vol. 2, 1911-1933 (Oxford, 1987); 
Ben Pimlott and Chris Cook, eds., Trade Unions in British Politics (London, 1991). 
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respective labor movements and in the broader polity. The study of unions as 
institutions has fallen out of fashion in recent years, but labor’s institutions helped 
shape national political economy and culture. Both the AFL and the TUC were 
powerful political players, and they influenced not just internal union attitudes, but 
also state action—legislation, policing and prosecution, and foreign policy—and that 
influence continued in the early years of the Cold War. The AFL was always much 
larger than the CIO (more than double its membership by the mid-1940s) and the 
AFL’s anticommunism had a correspondingly larger influence on the course of 
American politics.4 
Comparing the USA and the UK has an obvious logic, given the ubiquity of the 
comparison during the McCarthy era and since (articulated early by Lord Chancellor 
Jowitt in his remarks in 1950, when he told the House of Lords that he hoped “the 
British Upper Chamber will set an example to the American Upper Chamber.”)5 
Historian David Caute threaded the comparison throughout The Great Fear, his 
study of McCarthyism: “we need only glance momentarily to notice,” he wrote, “that 
Britain also committed itself to a political and military alliance against the Soviet 
Union, but without the corollary of domestic red-baiting and witch-hunting.”6 The 
                                                        
4 In 1938, three years after the founding of the CIO, the AFL had 3.5 million 
members, the CIO 1.9 million; by 1947, the AFL had 8.5 million members, the CIO 4.5 
million. Leo Wolman, Trade Union Membership, 1897-1962 (Washington, DC, 1965), 
8. 
5 Hansard, vol. 166, March 29, 1950, 609. 
6 David Caute, The Great Fear: The Anti-communist Purge Under Truman and 
Eisenhower (London, 1978), 30 [emphasis in original.] Karen Potter makes a similar 
claim: “More spy scandals of the late 1940s and 1950s occurred in Britain than in 
the United States. Yet the United States reacted much more radically to the 
perceived Communist threat.” Potter, “British McCarthyism,” in Rhodri Jeffreys-
Jones and Andrew Lownie, eds., North American Spies: New Revisionist Essays 
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large literature on the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ has explored 
exhaustively how “the idea of an aggressive communism hardened into an 
undeviating dogma” in Whitehall and Washington, explaining how an ostensibly 
socialist Labour government could compete with American policymakers in 
demonstrating their anticommunist credentials.7 But this special relationship took a 
much more attenuated form in domestic policy. Both states waged an aggressive 
campaign against the Soviet Union in the postwar years, while their approach to 
homegrown communists diverged. This divergence underscores the contingency of 
red-scare politics. McCarthyism didn’t happen there, to borrow Seymour Martin 
Lipset’s phrase, and it didn’t have to happen in the USA either.8 
*** 
                                                                                                                                                                     
(Edinburgh, 1991), 143-157, For other comparative reflections, see Joan Mahoney, 
“Civil Liberties in Britain during the Cold War: The Role of the Central Government,” 
The American Journal of Legal History, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Jan., 1989), pp. 53-100; 
Mahoney, “Constitutionalism, the Rule of Law, and the Cold War,” in Tom Campbell, 
K.D. Ewing, and Adam Tomkins, eds., The Legal Protection of Human Rights: Sceptical 
Essays (Oxford, 2011), 127-147; Eleanor Bontecou, The Federal Loyalty-Security 
Program (Ithaca, 1953); Larry Ceplair, Anticommunism in Twentieth-Century 
America: A Critical History (Santa Barbara, 2011), 4-6; Reg Whitaker, “Cold War 
Alchemy: How America, Britain, and Canada Transformed Espionage into 
Subversion, Intelligence and National Security, vol. 15, no. 2 (2000), 177-210.  For a 
definitive study of McCarthyism, see Ellen Schrecker, Many Are the Crimes: 
McCarthyism in America (Boston, 1998.) 
7 John Saville, The Politics of Continuity: British Foreign Policy and the Labour 
Government, 1945-46 (London, 1993), 58; see also Marc J. Selverstone, Constructing 
the Monolith: The United States, Great Britain, and International Communism, 1945-
1950 (Cambridge, MA, 2009); Hugh Wilford, The CIA, the British Left, and the Cold 
War: Calling the Tune? (London, 2004); Terry H. Anderson, The United States, Great 
Britain, and the Cold War, 1944-1947 (Columbia, Mo., 1981); Giora Goodman, “The 
British Government and the Challenge of McCarthyism in the Early Cold War,” 
Journal of Cold War Studies, vol.  12, no. 1 (Winter 2010), 62-97; Phillip Deery, “’A 
Very Present Menace’: Attlee, Communism, and the Cold War,” Australian Journal of 
Politics and Society, vol. 44, no. 1 (1998), 69-93 
8 Seymour Martin Lipset and Gary Marks, It Didn’t Happen Here: Why Socialism 
Failed in the United States (New York, 2000). 
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Historians have written a great deal about British and American communist 
labor movements and leaders, and much less on labor anticommunism. When 
unions appear in the historiography of domestic anticommunism, it is most often as 
targets, rather than originators, of anticommunist politics and policy. America labor 
anticommunism has received more systematic attention than British, and both 
literatures concentrate on the post-1945 years. Historians have documented how 
American unions drummed both communist members and entire unions out of the 
AFL and its more liberal competitor, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, aided 
by the 1947 Taft-Hartley law that required union leaders to repudiate Communism. 
Scholarship on anticommunism in British unions is less developed. It is visible most 
often in studies of communist organizing that describe the suppression of red 
activists by union leaders.9 Both literatures tend to treat labor anticommunism 
primarily as a reactive defense against anti-union assaults by employers and the 
state.10 In recent years, historians seeking to understand the rise of American 
conservatism have produced a shelf of books on anticommunist movements of 
conservative women, California engineers, and Southern segregationists.11 This 
                                                        
9 Nina Fishman, The British Communist Party and the Trade Unions, 1933-1945 
(Aldershot, 1995); Matthew Worley, Class Against Class: The communist Party in 
Britain Between the World Wars (London, 2002.)   
10 See, for example, Shelton Stromquist, ed., Labor’s Cold War: Local Politics in a 
Global Context (Urbana, IL, 2008); Robert W. Cherny, William Issel, and Kieran 
Walsh Taylor, American Labor and the Cold War: Grassroots Politics and Postwar 
Political Culture (New Brunswick, NJ, 2004); Nina Fishman, “The Phoney Cold War 
in British Trade Unions,” Contemporary British History, 15, 3(2001), 83-104;   
11 Michelle Nickerson, Mothers of Conservatism: Women and the Postwar Right 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: 
Origins of the New American Right (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Jeff 
Woods, Black Struggle, Red Scare: Segregation and Anti-Communism in the South, 
1948-1968 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2004), and George 
 7 
revisionist scholarship is bringing us closer to a new synthesis of the popular 
politics of the Cold War. Labor anticommunism deserves a prominent role in that 
story. Anticommunism was one of the widest planks in the platform of modern 
American conservatism, and it provided a common politics that united 
heterogeneous constituencies.12 
In Britain, on the other hand, a surge of scholarship on the domestic Cold War 
has not produced a comparable literature on British anticommunism, labor or 
otherwise, and the historian seeking a survey of anticommunist attitudes, 
movements, or policies will instead be struck by its absence. Indeed, the phrase 
‘British anticommunism” (hyphenated or not) scarcely appears in contemporary or 
historical accounts. While American anticommunism and its later manifestation, 
McCarthyism, have been variously described as a syndrome, a style, and a “great 
fear,” British anticommunism is a historiographical nonentity.13 This difference 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Lewis, The White South and the Red Menace: Segregationists, Anticommunism, and 
Massive Resistance (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2004). 
12 Jennifer Luff, Commonsense Anticommunism: Labor and Civil Liberties Between the 
World Wars (Chapel Hill, NC, 2012); Victor Silverman, Imagining Internationalism in 
American and British Labor, 1939–1949 (Urbana and Chicago, 2000); Markku 
Ruotsila, British and American Anti-communism Before the Cold War (London, 2001); 
“Leftward Ramparts: Labor and Anticommunism between the World Wars,” in 
Robert Justin Goldstein, ed., Little ‘Red Scares’: Anti-Communism and Political 
Repression in the United States, 1921-1946 (Farnam: Ashgate, 2014), 165-94; Bert 
Cochran, Labor and Communism: The Conflict that Shaped American Unions 
Princeton, 1977); Harvey A. Levenstein, Communism, Anti-Communism, and the CIO 
(Westport, Conn., 1981); Luff, "New Men of Power: Ronald Reagan, Jack Tenney, and 
Postwar Labor Anticommunism," in De-Centering Cold War History: Local and Global 
Change, edited by Jadwiga E. Pieper Mooney and Fabio Lanza. London and New 
York: Routledge, 2013, 99-122. 
13 In British historiography, “antisocialism” rather than anticommunism is a more 
common subject, and by and large writings on antisocialism examine it as a specific 
politics targeting socialism per se, not as a catch-all category that also encompassed 
anticommunism. See, for example, Kenneth D. Brown, “The Anti-Socialist Union, 
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surely derives from postwar domestic politics and not from international affairs, a 
realm where a developing Anglo-American “special relationship” drew British and 
American foreign policy ever closer in the effort to “contain” Communism. There 
was no British analogue to the House Un-American Activities Committee, Senator 
Joseph McCarthy’s lists of alleged communist spies, the Hollywood blacklist, or the 
atomic espionage trial of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. In Britain, “there is no 
complacency, no panic, no hysteria” over Communism, Lord Chancellor Viscount 
Jowitt told the House of Lords in March 1950, as he argued against purging the civil 
service of communists. “You cannot cast out Satan by means of Beelzebub.” British 
traditions of tolerance and civil liberties forestalled the paroxysms of reaction and 
repression that convulsed the U.S.14 
Or so the story goes. The prevalence of this interpretation of Britain as “a 
peaceable kingdom during the global age of extremes” goes far toward explaining 
the absence of a literature on British anticommunism, but it is overdue for 
                                                                                                                                                                     
1908-1949,” in Kenneth D. Brown, ed., Essays in Anti-Labour History: Responses to 
the Rise of Labour in Britain (Basingstoke, 1974). 234-261; Arthur McIvor, “’A 
Crusade for Capitalism’: The Economic League, 1919-1939,” Journal of 
Contemporary History, 23 (1988), 631-655; Ross McKibbin, “Class and Conventional 
Wisdom: The Conservative Party and the ‘Public’ in Inter-war Britain,” in McKibbin,  
Ideologies of Class: Social Relations in Britain 1880–1950 (Oxford, 1990), 259–93;  
and McKibbin, Classes and Cultures 202-204, 529-31; and Laura Beers, “Counter-
Toryism: Labour’s Response to Anti-Socialist Propaganda, 1918-39,” in Matthew 
Worley, ed., The Foundations of the British Labour Party: Identities, Cultures, and 
Perspectives, 1900-39 (Farnham, 2009), 231-54. 
14 House of Lords Debates, vol. 166, 649-51, March 29, 1950. For a recent statement 
of this argument, see Harriet Jones, “The Impact of the Cold War,” in Paul Addison 
and Harriet Jones, eds., A Companion to Contemporary Britain, 1939-2000, p. 24: 
British domestic anticommunism was “relatively restrained. This can be attributed 
to British political culture, with a party system which tended to encourage reasoned 
debate rather than radical extremes of thought, and a professional Civil Service 
which provided a stable and experienced framework for policy advice and 
implementation.”  
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reconsideration.15 The makings of a reinterpretation can be found in the growing 
scholarship on the British ‘”secret state,” which relies on the partially-released 
records of the British domestic intelligence agency, MI5, as well as Scotland Yard 
and the Metropolitan Police, to reconstruct the regimes of political policing that 
emerged during World War I. The full extent of police surveillance and repression of 
communists and other radicals, along with Irish nationalists and anticolonial 
activists, is only beginning to come into view.16 Likewise historians of British 
propaganda have uncovered the workings of the Foreign Office’s Information 
Research Department, which operated as a sort of domestic Congress of Cultural 
Freedom beginning in 1947.17 Finally, scholars of civil liberties have taken square 
aim at the claim that the ‘rule of law’ protected political dissent in the twentieth 
century, an account that is, in the words of historians K.D. Ewing and C.A. Gearty, “at 
                                                        
15 James Vernon, “The Local, the Imperial and the Global: Repositioning Twentieth-
Century Britain and the Brief Life of its Social Democracy,” Twentieth Century British 
History, vol. 21, 3 (2010), 407. 
16 Richard Thurlow, The Secret State: British Internal Security in the Twentieth 
Century (Oxford 2003); Peter Hennessy, The Secret State: Preparing for the Worst, 
1945-2010 (London: Allen Lane, 2002; rev. ed., 2010); Christopher Andrew, The 
Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (London, 2009). Most 
scholarship on interwar civil liberties in Britain uses a framework of ‘extremism’ to 
describe state repression of both communists and Fascists. See, for instance, Gerald 
D. Anderson, Fascists, Communists, and the National Government: Civil Liberties in 
Great Britain, 1931-1937 Columbia, MO., 1983); K.D. Ewing and C.A. Gearty, The 
Struggle for Civil Liberties: Political Freedom and the Rule of Law in Britain, 1914-
1945 (Oxford, 2000); Janet Clark, The National Council for Civil Liberties and the 
Policing of Interwar Politics, Manchester, 2012.) Britain contended with a significant 
Fascist movement, the British Union of Fascists, led by Oswald Mosley, a former MP, 
and by the 1930s, fascism and Communism were linked in public discourse as 
‘extremist’ movements. As numerous historians have noted, police 
disproportionately repressed communist-led movements, showing more solicitude 
for the political rights of Fascists; see, for example, Clark, National Council for Civil 
Liberties, 58. 
17 Andrew Defty, Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda 1945–53: The 
Information Research Department (London, 2004.) 
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best complacent, and at worst wholly out of touch with reality.”18 Historians of 
Britain have written widely on the cultural and social aspects of British cold war 
culture; the full extent of its repressive aspects has yet to be charted.19 
In contrast to the relative dearth of scholarship on domestic labor 
anticommunism, we have a substantial literature on the postwar enlistment of trade 
unions in Cold War diplomacy. Even before the war ended, Anglo-American trade 
union leaders worked closely with their respective governments to sideline and 
stymie communist unions in Africa, Asia, and Europe, and particularly in the US, 
trade union leaders attained more authority in foreign policy than they ever 
exercised domestically.20 The alacrity with which union officials embraced these 
                                                        
18 Ewing and Gearty, The Struggle for Civil Liberties, v. 
19 See, for example, the special issue on “Britain and the Cultural Cold War,” 
Contemporary British History, vol. 19 (2005); Tony Shaw, “The Politics of Cold War 
Culture,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2001, pp. 59-76; Shaw, ‘The 
British Popular Press and the Early Cold War’, History, vol. 83, no. 269 (January 
1998), 66-85; Shaw, British Cinema and the Cold War: The State, Propaganda and 
Consensus (London, 2000). 
20 See, for example, Yevette Richards Jordan, "Race, Gender, and Anticommunism in 
the International Labor Movement: The Pan-African Connections of Maida 
Springer," Journal of Women's History 11, 2 (Summer 1999): 35-5; Geert Van 
Goethem and Robert Anthony Waters, Jr., eds., American Labor's Global 
Ambassadors: The International History of the AFL-CIO during the Cold War (New 
York, 2013); Ronald Radosh, American Labor and United States Foreign Policy (New 
York, 1969); Edmund F. Wehrle, Between a River and a Mountain: The AFL-CIO and 
the Vietnam War (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 2005); Geert Van Goethem, ‘Labor's Second 
Front: The Foreign Policy of the American and British Trade Union Movements 
during the Second World War,’ Diplomatic History, 34, 4 (2010), 663-680; Dennis 
MacShane, International Labour and the Origins of the Cold War (Oxford 1992); Peter 
Weiler, British Labour and the Cold War (Stanford, 1988); and Anthony Carew, “The 
Trades Union Congress in the International Labour Movement,” in Alan Campbell, 
Nina Fishman, and John McIlroy, eds., British trade unions and industrial politics 
(London 1999), 145-167 Richard Stevens, “Cold War Politics: Communism and Anti-
Communism in the Trade Unions, ibid, 168-191. 
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roles is a clue to the depth of the hostility to communism they nurtured in the 
interwar years. 
*** 
 Reconstructing the story of labor anticommunism begins with the formation 
of communist parties following the Bolshevik Revolution. Labor organizing always 
occupied a central place in communist thinking, as strikes and solidarity were 
believed to breed militancy and class consciousness. Early on, Lenin came to believe 
that it made more sense to radicalize existing unions than to try to start new ones. 
In 1920, he explained that this effort “must be waged ruthlessly, and it must 
unfailingly be brought—as we brought it—to a point when all the incorrigible 
leaders of opportunism and social-chauvinism are completely discredited and 
driven out of the trade unions.”21 In Britain and the US, Communist Party strategy 
followed roughly the same lines: from 1921 to 1927, organize revolutionary blocs 
within existing trade unions; from 1927 to the early 1930s, organize independent 
communist unions; and from the early 1930s through the war, make a popular front 
against fascism. American and British communists, like their counterparts around 
the world, debated these strategies, often vociferously, but they generally respected 
Comintern decisions and faithfully tried to put them into action. Thus British and 
American trade unions experienced a similar approach from communist organizers 
and union members in the interwar years.22  
                                                        
21 V.I. Lenin, Left-wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder (1920), Marxist Internet 
Archive, (http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1920/lwc/ch06.htm), 
accessed 31 May 2014. 
22 This quick summary of the CPUSA and CPGB relies on the very large body of 
scholarship on both parties that has been produced in the years since the Soviet 
 12 
The British and American communist parties were also roughly similar in 
this period. Both were very small and experienced rapid turnover of membership. 
The CPUSA’s initial membership of about 20,000 fell below 10,000 in the 1920s; 
most members were working-class, and they were primarily foreign-born. The 
CPGB was likewise small, its membership hovering below 5,000 for most of the 
1920s with a spike over 12,000 around the 1926 General Strike. In the Popular 
Front era, both parties boomed; the CPUSA’s membership shot up to 75,000 in 1938, 
and the CPGB grew to nearly 20,000 members.23 In both labor movements, 
communists built sizeable caucuses in the mining and textile unions in the 1920s, 
and in Britain among engineering workers as well. In the 1930s, communist activists 
were more dispersed across each labor movement, and especially in heavy 
manufacturing. While Germany, Italy, and other European countries had entire 
communist unions and federations, in the USA and the UK the CP mostly operated as 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Union opened its archives. Since then scholars have debated the extent of Comintern 
control over each party, a question that derives in large part from Cold War-era 
politics in which anticommunists criticized national CPs as tools of Moscow, and 
communists insisted on their independence and organic origins. Much research has 
demonstrated that at various times, individual communist activists pursued their 
own strategies and disregarded Comintern directives, but in general, the British and 
American parties operated in accordance with international communist plans 
(demonstrated, most dramatically, in the parties’ rapid switch of policy following 
the Nazi-Soviet pact in 1939.) This debate seems to have run its course. In 
retrospect, surely the point of joining the communist Party was to affiliate local 
struggles with an international crusade that drew on the mighty resources of the 
Soviet Union, and party discipline was a logical corollary of this affiliation—not 
unlike the logic behind trade union affiliations to national and international bodies.  
23 Harvey Klehr, The Heyday of American Communism: The Depression Decade (New 
York, 1984), 5, 367; Andrew Thorpe, The British communist Party and Moscow, 1920-
1943 (Manchester, 2001), 283-84. 
 13 
a rump faction within existing unions.24 Anglo-American communists displayed the 
Bolsheviks’ characteristic pugnacity and flair for invective, regularly jeering the 
“treachery” of the TUC and the “reactionaries, incompetents and crooks” heading the 
AFL.25 
The TUC and the AFL also resembled each other in many respects. Both 
federations were unruly coalitions of diverse unions, managed by councils of union 
leaders and structured to mediate disputes between unions and promote trade 
unionism as an end in itself. Both had thrown their full backing behind World War I, 
and their memberships boomed under unprecedented state oversight of industrial 
production and collective bargaining. Both were disappointed in the postwar 
retrenchment by governments that sidelined unions and rolled back labor 
protections. AFL unions lost a quarter of their membership by 1923, and TUC ranks 
dropped by nearly a third in the same period. On the surface, the conditions in each 
country looked quite similar.26 
But the differences are more significant. American unions operated in a two-
party political system in which neither party was particularly friendly to labor, and 
                                                        
24 Cochran, Labor and Communism; Levenstein, Communism, Anti-Communism, and 
the CIO; Martin, Communism and the British Trade Unions; Nina Fishman, The British 
communist Party and the Trade Unions, 1933-1945 (Aldershot, 1995).  
25 A.J.P. Taylor remarked of this tendency, “It is curious how Communists used 
outrageous phrases publicly and were indignant when such phrases were turned 
against them.” Taylor, English History, 1914-1945 (Oxford, 1945), 143 n1. “The 
Principles and Program of the Trade Union Educational League,” Labor Herald, 
March 1922; Solomon Lozovsky, British and Russian Workers (London, 1926), 7.  
26 For general discussions of the early interwar labor movement, see Irving 
Bernstein, The Lean Years: A History of the American Worker, 1920-1933 (Boston, 
1960); H.A. Clegg, A History of British Trade Unions, vol. II, 1911-1933 (Oxford, 1985.) 
An insightful account by a contemporary can be found in R. H. Tawney, The 
American Labor Movement and Other Essays (New York, 1979.) 
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union members were as likely to be Republicans as Democrats. The AFL functioned 
less as a political machine than a political lobby, and in the 1920s, the AFL achieved 
few of its legislative goals. An abortive effort in 1924 to mobilize a third-party 
challenger, the Progressive Party, collapsed ignominiously. Industrial militancy fell 
off, and trade unionism was in crisis. British unionists, on the other hand, had the 
Labour party, in which they exercised a strong hand as unions controlled the 
majority of party bloc votes, and the Labour party had emerged from the war years 
on the upswing, regularly pulling a third of votes in national elections throughout 
the 1920s. The British labor movement operated in a climate of political possibility, 
and the formation of a short-lived minority Labour government in 1924 and another 
from 1929 to 1931 showed that labor could exercise real political influence. Union 
activists often clashed with Labour party leaders who showed more moderation in 
office than in their speeches to TUC conferences, but in Britain it was possible to 
believe that socialism—or at least trade unionism—was on the march.27 
In Britain, socialism and trade unionism went hand in hand. Most labor 
leaders fell somewhere between a moderate reformist socialism and a more radical 
Marxism. To radicals who organized in the communist Party, the moderation of both 
the TUC and the Labour Party betrayed the socialist vision and sold short both party 
and workers, and many historians have emphasized the ideological blur of the 
                                                        
27 On American labor and party politics in the 1920s, see Luff, Commonsense 
Anticommunism; Bernstein, The Lean Years; Selig Perlman and Philip Taft, History of 
Labor in the United States, 1896-1932 (New York: MacMillan, 1935.) On the 
relationship between the TUC and the Labour Party, see Lewis Minkin, The 
Contentious Alliance: Trade Unions and the Labour Party (Edinburgh, 1991); David 
Howell, MacDonald’s Party: Labour Identities and Crisis, 1922-1931 (Oxford, 2002); 
Matthew Worley, Labour Inside the Gate: A History of the British Labour Party 
Between the Wars (London, 2005). 
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“classic English pragmatism, empiricism, and dogma” that was characteristic of the 
TUC.28 It is important not to exaggerate the socialist commitments of TUC leaders, 
but rather to emphasize that there was little antisocialism among them. When 
contemporaries and historians described them as “conservative” the comparison 
was to radicals rather than to actual Conservatives.29  
In the USA, by contrast, antisocialism had become a central principle of the 
AFL by World War I. Skepticism about state power and doubts about the prospects 
of third parties in the American system led AFL president Samuel Gompers to 
deliver his famous riposte to socialist organizers in 1903: “Economically, you are 
unsound; socially you are wrong; industrially you are an impossibility.” While 
socialist and radical movements always swirled through AFL unions, federation 
leaders became increasingly hostile to even mild redistributive measures such as 
national health insurance or a minimum wage, believing that such initiatives 
undermined the impetus for unionism. During the Great War, AFL leaders attacked 
socialist pacifists as “traitors who talk peace and anti-Americanism and say they are 
for the working man.”30 The stalwart conservatism of American union leaders drew 
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the attention of social scientists such as Selig Perlman and Werner Sombart, who 
ventured an array of explanations ranging from prosperity to universal white 
manhood suffrage.31 For diffuse reasons, many American trade unionists preferred 
voluntarist unionism to a strong redistributive state. They were predisposed to 
dislike Soviet Communism.  
This political backdrop goes a long way toward explaining AFL and TUC 
reactions to the Russian revolution. Gompers lamented the Bolshevik takeover and 
withdrawal from the Entente: “Benedict Arnold’s history sounds glorious beside 
that of Lenine and Trotzky [sic], who licked the boots of his imperial majesty, 
Wilhelm II, for peace.”32 AFL leaders publicly supported the 1918 invasion of Russia 
at Archangel, and they exhorted British and European trade unionists to do the 
same. Gompers and the AFL consistently and energetically lobbied against 
diplomatic relations between the USA and the USSR, and churned out a steady 
stream of anti-Soviet exposes. “Lenine is as great an enemy of democracy as the 
Czar,” declared the American Federationist in 1919.33 Soviet subordination of unions 
to party particularly rankled AFL leaders. Labor antisocialism evolved swiftly and 
smoothly into an acrimonious labor anticommunism. 
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In Britain, by contrast, the TUC was an early supporter of the Hands Off 
Russia movement, which demanded withdrawal of British and American troops 
from Russia and diplomatic recognition of Russia, and sent a special delegation to 
advise Lloyd George of its views.34 In August 1920, the TUC, the Labour Party and 
the Parliamentary Labour threatened a general strike if the government followed 
through on threats of war with Russia over Poland. Meanwhile the TUC and the 
Labour party sent a joint delegation to Russia, where they were greeted with feasts 
and parades. To Soviet leaders, it looked as though Britain might be the next 
revolutionary front. As for the USA, Lenin allowed that “it may take a long time 
before help can come from you, comrades, American Workingmen.”35 
Thereafter, the AFL remained hostile, and the TUC friendly, toward the Soviet 
Union.  Domestic communism raised a more immediate challenge, however, for both 
labor movements. William Z. Foster, a veteran labor organizer, turned his Trade 
Union Educational League (TUEL) into the industrial arm of the CPUSA. The TUEL 
deplored the “conservative trade union bureaucracy,” proposing to “replace them 
with militants, with men and women unionists who look upon the labor movement 
not as a means for making an easy living, but as an instrument for the achievement 
of working-class emancipation.”36 Over the next several years, the TUEL organized 
factions in dozens of AFL unions around bread-and-butter issues like merging small 
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unions into large ones and forming a labor party. Among miners and textile workers, 
and in cities like Seattle and Chicago, the TUEL made real headway.37  
But it didn’t take long for AFL leaders to beat back the challenge. Gompers 
and his allies cast the TUEL as a Soviet plot, and organized a systematic purge of 
TUEL activists and leaders, driving them out of the unions. "Our officers in the 
National unions and in the local unions are constantly watching for them, and where 
we find that they are avowed communists,” a union official explained later, “they are 
found guilty and expelled."38 These moves were often ratified by the AFL 
membership. In 1923, when a communist organizer managed to get a credential as a 
delegate to the AFL convention, the convention voted 27,837 to 108 in favor of his 
banishment. The AFL had established a definitive policy that Communism would not 
be tolerated in the federation.39 Increasingly, AFL leaders framed their 
anticommunism in sweeping, jingoistic terms. “We stand for America, a democratic 
America, and we want the world to understand that fact,” declared the Federation in 
1925. The AFL would “use every honorable method to protect its own integrity 
against the corrupting, disintegrating, devastating preachings of communism.”40 
Meanwhile in Britain, the TUC convened an Anglo-Russian Joint Advisory 
Committee in 1924. In their opening declarations, the British aspired to “endeavour 
to promote international unity by using its mediatory influence,” while Soviets 
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hoped that the Anglo-Russian committee would enact the “fervent desire of the 
broadest mass of workers in every country” to erect a “barrier against capitalist 
reaction.”41 Historian Daniel Calhoun has recorded the remarkable intensity of this 
effort; numerous leaders of the TUC, including the future general secretary Walter 
Citrine, met repeatedly with such Soviet officials as Solomon Lozovsky and Mikhail 
Tomsky, in Moscow and London, to hash out the relationship. It was an 
extraordinary example of transnational labor diplomacy.42 (In 1925, a TUC official 
traveled to the AFL convention in 1925 to enlist them in this cause. “I say that you, 
workers of America, have much to learn from Russia,” he told the convention. AFL 
leaders scoffed “it is almost impossible to understand how any thoughtful 
democratic national labor movement could be so deceived as to lend the color of its 
support to such a treacherous proposal.”43) 
But the CPGB made less progress in signing up communist members from the 
rank and file. The Comintern began preparing a “separate opposition trade union 
movement” within the TUC that could “convert the revolutionary minority within 
each industry into a revolutionary majority,” and to this end formed the National 
Minority Movement (NMM). This effort was viewed skeptically by TUC leadership, 
who were “disdainfully contemptuous of native communists, uncritically respectful 
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of Russian communists, and loath to acknowledge any connections between them.”44 
Nevertheless, the TUC leadership reacted mildly to the NMM, and took few steps to 
hamper its initial efforts.45 Far from expelling communist activists, the TUC 
responded to their proposals and took account of their ideas. Indeed, TUC president 
A.A. Purcell expressed his sympathy with their vision, stating, “Our aim is not merely 
to build big unions,” but instead “changing the existing structure of capitalist society 
and bringing into being a Workers’ State.”46 
The close ties between the TUC and the Comintern stirred the national 
newspapers and the Conservative Party: the “General Council seems to be 
dominated now by pro-communists,” declared the Times.47  Meanwhile, the Labour 
Party faced its own red scare. In late 1923, a snap election resulted in the surprise 
formation of a minority government led by the Labour Party.  The short-lived 
government was dogged by red-baiting, fueled by Prime Minister Ramsay 
MacDonald’s efforts to negotiate diplomatic and trade relations with the Soviet 
Union. When the government dropped a planned prosecution of a communist editor, 
MacDonald lost the support of Liberals in Parliament. Days before the election, 
newspapers published the “Zinoviev letter,” which purported to be an intercepted 
communication from the Comintern president urging communists to agitate among 
British soldiers. The letter also suggested that efforts like the Anglo-Russian 
committee’s “exchange of delegates and workers” would help “extend and develop 
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the propaganda of ideas of Leninism in England and the colonies.”48 “Civil War Plot 
by Socialist Masters,” read the Daily Mail headline, and the Conservatives swept the 
elections.49 Labour’s support for the Soviet Union had helped drive it from power.  
But the labor movement maintained its friendly stance through the Anglo-
Soviet Committee, and with the NMM. It was the 1926 General Strike that soured the 
relationship. The story of the strike is well-known: the miners’ union was locked out 
by employers seeking wage concessions, and the TUC called a general strike in their 
support, which proved far more successful and popular than expected. Yet after nine 
days TUC leaders called off the strike without securing any concrete gains. 
Opprobrium rained down on the heads of TUC leaders, and much of it came from the 
CPGB and the Comintern, which sought repeatedly to donate $1 million to the TUC 
General Council in aid of the strike. The General Council declined the funds, but 
could not escape the many critiques of their conduct by Communists. Stalin himself 
explained, in a speech to Russian railway workers, that “the leaders of the General 
Council proved to be either direct traitors to the coal miners and the working class 
of England in general,” or worse, “weak-willed fellow-travelers of these traitors who 
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dreaded the struggle and, still more, a victory of the working class."50 Such remarks 
began to get under the skin of the leaders of the TUC. “We have exhibited patience 
and submitted to abuse which would have made some of us refuse to sit in 
conference with members of our own movement,” Citrine told the TUC convention 
in 1927.51  
Consequently, the TUC began to edge away from the communists. In 1926 the 
Anglo-Soviet Unity Committee ceased meeting, and the General Council announced 
that it would no longer recognize local trades councils that were affiliated with the 
NMM. Walter Citrine, TUC general secretary, published a series of articles decrying 
the “influence of communists in trade unions,” describing the web of organizations 
and front groups through which the CPGB operated. The TUC had been naïve, he 
wrote: “we were optimistic enough to believe that the steadying influence and 
shrewd practical commonsense” of the British would prevent “communist influence 
within our unions,” but instead the TUC had been “distracted and confused by 
savage criticism.”52  
At the same time, the Labour Party moved more strongly against the CPGB. In 
1925, the party’s conference voted against the CPGB’s application to affiliate to the 
Labour Party. The following year, Labour general secretary Arthur Henderson 
reiterated the decision in a party circular that quoted Comintern directives that 
communist “party allegiances must supersede all other responsibilities.” Thus CPGB 
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members could not be fully loyal Labourites. Henderson indicated the growing 
distance between party policy and TUC policy: “There has never been any doubt at 
the Head Office,” he wrote, “as to the tactics that have been constantly pursued by 
the communist Party to disrupt our movement, but the position has not been so 
clear to many supporters of the Party in our affiliated Trade Unions and Local 
Labour Parties.”53 The TUC’s shift had emboldened Labour Party leaders, who had 
held their fire until “confident that their trade union counterparts were prepared to 
comply.”54  
The stakes were high for the CPGB, which had gained some protection under 
the shelter of labor’s support. In October 1925, twelve CPGB leaders were arrested 
on charges of sedition, and party offices raided. Harry Pollitt, a Party leader, also 
blamed the labor movement: “we were expelled from the Labour movement, and 
[the government] thought that, seeing we were isolated, seeing we were unpopular, 
seeing that the official movement had in its own way disowned us, then was the 
time to attack, so that the official Labour Movement would not come to our 
assistance.” The jury voted to convict all twelve defendants and sentenced them to 
prison terms.55 
By the late 1920s, the TUC seemed to be heading toward the same policy of 
the AFL: anticommunist invective and expulsions. In both federations, communist 
critiques and challenges of union leaders and authority provoked a violent 
                                                        
53 Labour Party Circular, July 2, 1926, in Trades Union Congress archives, 
MSS.292/770/1. 
54 Howell, MacDonald’s Party, 404. 
55 “Communist Party on Trial: Harry Pollitt’s Defense,” TUC Papers,  Mss. 
292/770/2; Ewing and Gearty, Struggle for  Civil Liberties, 136-44; The Economist, 
November 28, 1925, 886. 
 24 
anticommunist reaction. Labour’s anticommunist reaction gathered steam. In 1928, 
the TUC voted to launch an inquiry into the “Dangers of Disruption” within its ranks, 
with special attention to “sinister, scurrilous, and unfair” criticism and opposition by 
outside groups, “the chief of which are the communist Party and the National 
Minority Movement.” The AFL praised the TUC’s turnabout: “American labor is in 
absolute accord with this clear-cut declaration of policy from Great Britain,” 
announced the federation.56 
In practice, however, the TUC crackdown turned out to be quite mild. The 
TUC kicked the communists out, but they didn’t leave. Few unions actually expelled 
any communists, and the TUC did not order any such expulsions. On the contrary, 
the TUC permitted unions to send communist delegates to its congresses, as Citrine 
patiently explained to confused unions inquiring about the TUC’s policy.57 By and 
large communists continued to operate in the TUC as they had before, albeit with 
somewhat more discretion. This was made easier by the Comintern’s new policy, 
announced in 1927, that communists should organize independent unions rather 
than “bore from within.” The CPGB dawdled and resisted doing so, organizing only 
two separate unions, before the Comintern’s policy changed again. Given the party’s 
relatively safe berth within the TUC, it made no sense to try to break away. 
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One reason for the TUC’s restraint was the disinterest in its affiliated unions 
in taking strong action. In response to its internal investigation on the “dangers of 
disruption,” the TUC received reports from 124 affiliated unions. Of those replies, 92 
indicated that there had been no communist disruption at all, and 32 reported some. 
The TUC general council considered this response to indicate “some reluctance” on 
the part of unions to “give advertisement to communist and minority movements.”58 
Numerous unions had taken their own action in 1927 and 1928: the Amalgamated 
Engineering Union voted to condemn the NMM and the CP by a vote of 41 to 11; and 
the Miners Federation passed a similar resolution by a vote of 620,000 to 8,000. A 
few unions took more severe steps, such as the National Union of General and 
Municipal Workers, which expelled 18 members and dissolved branches with 
communist ties.59 The Shop Assistants Union prepared a declaration for its elected 
officials requiring them to declare: “I am not a member of the communist Party or 
the National Minority Movement.”60 But the TUC’s investigation found these actions 
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to be outliers rather than widespread, and there was little internal pressure to move 
against the CP. 61 The TUC practiced tolerance.62 
This tolerance extended beyond its membership, as the TUC regularly 
protested the arrest and prosecution of Communists. For example, during the 1925 
communist trial, the TUC registered “its emphatic protest” against a proceedings 
“animated by the political prejudice of the present Government.”63 When MI5 raided 
Arcos, the Soviet trading agency, in 1927, TUC leaders formally protested to the 
Prime Minister, despite the developing rancor toward the Soviet Union among the 
General Council.64 
 Perhaps the most striking example of TUC’s defenses of the civil liberties of 
communists came in the case of Percy Glading, who was an grinder at the Royal 
Navy’s Woolwich Arsenal, and a member of the Amalgamated Engineering Union 
(AEU). Glading was fired in October 1928 on the grounds that he was an avowed 
communist and would not renounce his views. Glading appealed to his union for 
help. The AEU brought the matter to the TUC General Council, which spent the next 
four months in dogged pursuit of the case. In a formal meeting on February 4, a TUC 
delegation met with Labour Party officials at the House of Commons to discuss the 
                                                        
61 “Recent Trade Union Decisions Re Communist and Minority Movements,” in 
Trades Union Congress archives, MSS.292/773/9/2. 
62 Historian Roderick Martin suggests that this tolerance grew out of “a genuine 
reluctance to apply political tests for union membership, paralleling an earlier 
reluctance to apply religious tests, and partly because communist policies in the 
international and industrial field were often merely an extension of their own.” 
Martin, Communism and the British Trade Unions, 54. 
63 Report of the Proceedings at the 56th Annual Trades Union Congress (London, 
1926), 274. 
64 Gabriel Gorodetsky, The Precarious Truce: Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1924-27 
(Cambridge, 1977), 247; Saville, The Politics of Continuity, 218. 
 27 
matter. TUC delegates demanded to know “in what way as a workman Mr Glading 
had transgressed the conditions of employment at the Arsenal, and further, it ought 
to be made clear as to whether the Government would adopt this policy of dismissal 
to, say, a Socialist.” The Labour MPs hemmed and hawed, reluctant to bring the 
matter up on the floor of Parliament as “political capital might be made out of the 
question.” The TUC barraged Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin with inquiries and 
demands for further information. Percy Glading did not get his job back, and the 
Admiralty did not change its policy, but the TUC had made clear its view that 
“employees of any government department should be entitled to freedom of thought 
in so far as political matters were concerned.”65 TUC leaders had defended the civil 
liberties of a communist member, even as the TUC was speaking against communist 
organizers within its ranks.66 
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The AFL, on the other hand, collaborated in crackdowns on Communists. AFL 
leaders used their confidential contacts with the early federal Bureau of 
Investigation during and after WWI to pass along intelligence about communist 
organizers (including the one expelled from the AFL’s 1923 convention.) Federation 
leaders consulted with Justice Department lawyers preparing to try William Z. 
Foster on sedition charges in 1923.  At one point in the early 1920s, an AFL staffer, 
Ellis Searles, had his own desk set up in the BI headquarters for consulting its files 
on communists. But this relationship ended with J. Edgar Hoover’s takeover of the 
BI in 1924. The legal authority for surveilling communists and other political 
radicals had expired with the wartime Sedition Act in 1920. Although the Federation 
regretted the loss of BI intelligence, AFL leaders opposed the enactment of a 
peacetime sedition law that would criminalize Communism and subversion. Such a 
law, they feared, could be easily wielded against strikes and labor boycotts. A better 
approach, they argued, was exposure: identify and publicize Communists and their 
activities, and Americans would shun them. AFL leaders earned a reputation as 
reliable leaders in the fight against communism. “I believe your organization is 
entitled to the gratitude of the Congress of the United States and of the American 
people,” Republican Congressman Hamilton Fish remarked in 1930; “the American 
Federation of Labor has been a bulwark and has consistently exposed and 
combatted communistic and revolutionary activities.”67 
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 Through the 1920s, the TUC grew more averse to communists within its 
ranks, but its leaders rarely questioned the legitimacy of the CPGB and did not 
endorse broader crackdowns on the party. In interwar Britain, anticommunist 
politics was not the province of Labour, but belonged to Conservatives like Winston 
Churchill and William Joynson Hicks, who regularly redbaited both Labour 
politicians and trade unionists.  In the 1920s, neither the Republican nor Democratic 
parties troubled much over Communism after the first red scare.68 Denouncing reds 
became the cause of a fringe movement of antiradicals. But for the AFL in these 
years, anticommunism became a philosophical tenet, figuring much more centrally 
for the labor movement than it did in mainstream politics.  
*** 
 By the early 1930s, two distinctive styles of labor anticommunism had taken 
shape in the AFL and the TUC. The upheavals of the 1930s disrupted both. The 
Comintern’s declaration of a Popular Front sent communist organizers back into the 
ranks of the unions, while mounting popular admiration for the Soviet Union and its 
strong economic performance during the Depression produced a new upsurge of 
membership outside the unions. In Britain, TUC leaders who had just disentangled 
themselves from the Party were reluctant to link arms again so soon. TUC leaders 
resisted calls to form a Popular Front, increasingly vehemently. In October 1934, the 
TUC issued Circular 16, termed the “Black Circular” by the CPGB, which formally 
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barred communists from admission to trades councils. In this case, the impetus 
came largely from the Labour Party leadership, which had formally rejected a united 
front in the same month. But as before, the Black Circulars had little practical effect, 
and communist organizers continued to circulate with little interference.69 
In the USA, the ripples from the Popular Front helped crack the labor 
movement in two. The New Deal’s promotion of unionization fractured the AFL 
when liberal union leaders bolted the federation and launched a competing one, the 
Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO.) Although many CIO leaders were 
veteran anticommunists, they needed organizers, fast. The CPUSA, newly flush with 
members and eager to implement the Popular Front policy, offered its troops. Thus 
while the TUC continued to hold the CP at arms-length, a sizeable wing of the 
American labor movement pulled party activists in. Several hundred CPUSA 
organizers joined the CIO payroll, and they were admired by union leaders for their 
"sophistication, some education, some training" in organizing tactics. As in Britain, 
American communist organizers were discreet about their allegiances, hoping to 
prove the merits of Communism by demonstrating their loyalty and diligence.70  
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When AFL leaders discovered this new alliance, they were astonished—and 
outraged. Their long experience in tracking communists had given them good 
intelligence sources and a thick dossier on the Party. They approached Martin Dies, 
a Texas Democrat heading a Congressional committee to investigate Communism 
and Fascism, and offered to share their files. When the Dies Committee began its 
hearings in August 1938, AFL official John P. Frey was the third witness. 
Communists had invaded the labor movement, Frey announced, and they dominated 
the CIO, following “Moscow’s instructions to ‘bore from within’ the American labor 
movement.”  He named names: union organizers, the members of the CPUSA 
national leadership, and even some union officers. Frey’s intelligence was solid, and 
the news exploded like a bombshell. The Dies Committee became a great engine of a 
new red scare.71 In the aftermath of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, a flood of new legislation 
proposed limits on the political organizing of communists and fascists. While the 
AFL had stood with other civil libertarians in the 1920s and 1930s to oppose such 
laws, now the situation had changed. The AFL endorsed the Hatch Act, which 
banned communists from serving in the federal civil service, in 1939. In 1940, the 
Federation lobbied for the Smith Act, which effectively criminalized membership in 
the Communist Party. In the late 1930s, labor anticommunists moved beyond union 
bans and expulsions to helping to erect the legal architecture of anticommunism and 
McCarthyism. 72 
 In these years, AFL officials also began to redbait Roosevelt administration 
officials. In contrast to liberal CIO unionists who championed the New Deal, 
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conservative AFL officials were on the sidelines, and had little say in labor 
policymaking. They were particularly frustrated by labor-policy officials who 
seemed to favor the CIO’s mass unions. Beginning in 1937, AFL officials charged that 
Communist sympathies motivated National Labor Relations Board officers. As Green 
put it, “many employees of the Board are radical-minded, if not communistic.”73 This 
tendency to paint the New Deal red was not unique to the AFL, of course; 
conservative bankers and industrialists had done so since the early 1930s. What 
stood out was the AFL’s targeted redbaiting of specific officials, based on careful 
research, with the intent of rolling back particular policies. What also became clear 
in these years was how far the AFL had drifted from mainstream liberal labor 
politics. Its conservatism put AFL leaders outside the New Deal, but at the forefront 
of anticommunist politics. 
*** 
 In the 1930s, both the AFL and the TUC had become more hostile to 
communism. During the war, their trajectories diverged. While the Soviet entry into 
the Allied coalition froze in place American labor anticommunism, British trade 
unionists became markedly more friendly to the CPGB. At war’s end, Labour Party 
leaders assumed the levers of state power, and Ernest Bevin, head of the Transport 
Workers and avowed anticommunist, became Foreign Secretary. A strong left wing 
checked the anticommunism of the interwar years. “Bevin and the other Labour 
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leaders frequently had to temper what they said in public if they wanted to avoid 
criticism. The same was true for the leaders of the TUC,” according to Weiler,” who 
found their own diplomacy restricted by the pro-Soviet sentiments of the rank and 
file.”74 While Bevin and Attlee angled against the Soviet Union for influence in 
Europe and developed a foreign policy that was increasingly hostile to the Soviets, 
the Labour government made little effort to propagate anticommunist sentiment at 
home in 1946 and 1947. As Weiler shows, although the Cabinet’s interdepartmental 
Russia Committee prepared a plan for a domestic propaganda campaign, Bevin and 
Labour Party officials refused to use it, as “the Soviet Union’s popularity within the 
labour movement remained much too strong.”75 One measure of this strength was 
the reception given by TUC delegates to AFL leader George Meany, who visited the 
TUC convention in September 1945. When he denounced the Soviet Union and its 
“system of worker blacklists and deportation to labour camps,” delegates shouted 
“Shame!” and “That is entirely wrong.”76  
 Meanwhile, armistice gave AFL anticommunists license to resume their 
anticommunist attacks. In July 1945, AFL president William Green urged a group of 
textile workers to vote against joining the CIO, “a communist-dominated 
organization taking orders from Soviet Russia” which had sought to “cripple 
America’s national defense program” before the war.77 Throughout 1946 and early 
1947 AFL leaders continued to paint the CIO red, claiming its leaders “openly 
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followed the Communist line,” despite the fact that a number of CIO unions had also 
begun to sideline and expel Communists. Walter Reuther, elected president of the 
United Auto Workers in March 1946, was the most prominent of these CIO 
anticommunists.78 Their tireless efforts cemented an image of the AFL as antiradical. 
FBI head J. Edgar Hoover told Congress in 1947: “The Communists have long viewed 
with envy the A.F. of L,” where “they admit they play a very small role,” in contrast 
to the CIO, whose members had been “outwitted, outmaneuvered, and outwaited by 
Communists.”79  
Moreover, when they disagreed with federal policy, Federation officials 
continued to insinuate that red influences were at work. In 1946, when the Truman 
administration intervened in a steel strike by approving steel price increases, Green 
complained that “the disturbing element in this situation is the collusion between 
those persons in the Government seeking to perpetuate government controls or 
regimentation for their own purposes and Communist leaders in unions who seek to 
discredit collective bargaining and free enterprise.”80 His implication of closet 
Communist sympathies in the government was quite clear. That same year, the AFL 
convention heard a report read by John Frey that warned that “for reasons which it 
is difficult to understand,” the CPUSA had installed “dependable members in many 
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of the Federal departments, including the Department of State.”81 It is worth 
reiterating that these practices preceded the tensions of the early Cold War. Indeed, 
AFL leaders were among the earliest American voices clamoring for a confrontation 
with the Soviet Union. “The time has come to call a halt to the aggressive tactics of 
Soviet Russia and her Communist dependencies,” Green told a convention of Illinois 
unionists in September 1946. “With us, America is always right and it is Russia now 
this is [sic] always wrong.”82 
 In both the US and the UK, trade union officials played a prominent role in 
postwar foreign policy, and veteran labor anticommunists such as Jay Lovestone 
and Irving Brown in the US and Walter Citrine in the UK advised their governments 
on labor policy in Greece, Germany, Japan, and elsewhere.83 They were well placed 
to detect the rumblings of the growing conflict. In 1947, as observers began to call 
this conflict a “cold war,” the political context for both labor federations changed. 
For the AFL, the world finally seemed to be catching up with them and recognizing 
the gravity of the Soviet threat, while for the TUC, Cold War pressures began to give 
anticommunist union leaders and Labour officials more room to maneuver. 
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 One of the earliest manifestations of this new dynamic in the US was 
Truman’s March 1947 executive order banning Communists from the civil service. 
Well before Truman’s decision, the AFL had been agitating for such a ban. At its 
October 1946 convention, a resolution decrying the “insidious forces of 
Communism” called for “the dismissal from the [government] service of any known 
member of the Communist party, or anyone known to be in sympathy with any 
subversive movement.” The resolution was unanimously adopted by the convention, 
which also directed the AFL to send a copy to the President.84  
In the wake of Truman’s order, the House of Representatives considered a 
bill to enact Truman’s order into federal legislation, and called the labor federations 
to testify. Both the AFL and the CIO represented government workers.  The United 
Public Workers (CIO) lined up with the American Civil Liberties Union, the National 
Lawyers Guild, and the American Jewish Congress to denounce the loyalty-security 
program as “subversive of important principles and guaranties of liberties,” and the 
“first step toward the establishment in America of a police state.”85 The American 
Federation of Government Employees (AFL) declared, “loyalty to the United States 
of America is and must always be a fundamental perquisite to employment in the 
federal service,” and condemned “disloyal or subversive” government employees. 
The AFL union urged an even more stringent screening program, testifying that “it is 
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just as important that people already incumbents of positions in the Government 
service should be subjected to searching scrutiny as to their loyalty as should 
applicants,” and declared full faith in the FBI, which was “well-equipped to do this 
kind of a job.”86 Later that year, William Green recommended, “similar action should 
be taken to weed out the undesirables employed in the legislative and the judiciary 
branches.”87 The Veterans of Foreign Wars and the American Legion joined with the 
AFL in support of the bill. 
 Meanwhile, the Congress was also considering a proposal to limit the rights 
of unions to strike and picket. The Taft-Hartley bill, passed in 1947, contained a 
provision requiring union officers to sign an anticommunist affidavit, raising the ire 
of AFL and CIO alike. AFL officials railed against the bill, especially outraged given 
the loyalty they had demonstrated so assiduously. Nevertheless, the affidavit was a 
boon to anticommunists in both federations. The CIO expelled eleven unions 
between 1949-1950, and both AFL and CIO quickly organized the nearly one million 
expelled members into new, explicitly anticommunist unions.88  
 The Dies Committee, now reformulated as HUAC, had resumed its work, and 
it continued to provide a forum for AFL unionists to attack CIO rivals. The AFL 
formally endorsed its continuation, praising the committee’s “excellent work under 
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the most adverse conditions.89 In 1947, Congress considered a bill to outlaw 
Communism altogether. Green appeared to oppose the law, resurrecting the 
federation’s old opposition to statutory limits on political organizing. Such laws 
would merely drive Communists underground, Green warned. The best weapon was 
exposure: “Merciless public exposition of the men and methods utilized by 
Communists,” he said, “will accomplish more than a thousand criminal penalties 
directed solely against their political activities.”90 Throughout the Cold War, HUAC 
offered just such a forum for interrogation and humiliation. 
 By the late 1940s, the signal features of American anticommunism and 
McCarthyism were in place: legal limits on Communist organizing, bans on 
Communist employment and union membership, and the theater of Congressional 
hearings. Labor anticommunists had a hand in producing each element of this 
regime. One other aspect of American anticommunism makes more sense in this 
light: its tendency to focus on elites. Numerous contemporaries commented on this 
peculiar feature of American anticommunism, especially since in most other 
countries, scrutiny fell on the working class rather than the intelligentsia, while in 
the US, the working class seemed to support McCarthyist measures. In 1955, 
Seymour Martin Lipset puzzled over this issue, commenting that “in the United 
States and Britain, the conservative workers, those who back the Tory or the 
Republican parties, tend to have the most intolerant attitudes,” and particularly in 
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the US, “the lower the person is in socio-economic or educational attainment, the 
more likely he is to support McCarthy, favor restrictions on civil liberties, and back a 
‘get-tough’ policy on the Communist states.”91 For Richard Hofstadter, the 
explanation lay in a “grievance against intellectuals,” which was why McCarthyism 
“showed such a relentless and indiscriminate appetite for victims and why it 
seemed happier with respectable and powerful targets.”92 Anticommunism had 
been a core working-class politics for decades, and trade unionists had been 
targeting and purging reds long before McCarthy. Little wonder that many working-
class voters endorsed extending these practices more broadly. 
 In Britain, of course, there was not a corresponding McCarthyist attack on 
elites or intellectuals. The TUC’s anticommunist catechisms had been far more 
muted, and while Lipset saw increasing intolerance among British workers, this did 
not extend to a broader push for restrictions on civil liberties.93 It was the Cold War 
that provided a new impetus for Labour and TUC officials to venture some moves 
against the CPGB. In late 1946 Attlee denounced the Soviet Union at a TUC 
convention, arousing the ire of many members (and the cheers of an AFL delegate in 
attendance,) and the government worked hard to block a CPGB affiliation with the 
Labour Party.94 Thereafter his government and the TUC worked quietly to try to 
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shift popular consensus, and in 1948 created the Information Research Department, 
a propaganda operation, to sow doubts about the Soviet Union and Communism 
among the British public.95 The government’s care in keeping the IRD secret from 
the public indicates how much opposition they expected such efforts to generate. As 
the Labour Party and the TUC sought to edge the CPGB to the margins of their 
membership, they increasingly voiced some of the same critiques heard from 
American unionists: the Soviet Union was undemocratic, the CPGB conniving. But 
party and union officials avoided broader calls for limitations on civil liberties, let 
alone public trials and humiliations, for Communists in the early Cold War years. 96 
The government’s 1948 enactment of “negative vetting” of civil servants 
exemplified this approach. In announcing the policy, Attlee emphasized its 
limitations: “there should be no general purge, no general witch hunt.”97 The TUC 
formally protested the plan, but not very energetically, and most of its protests 
involved demands for trade union representation of accused civil servants.  Attlee 
conceded a slot for a trade union representative on the government’s advisory 
board overseeing the vetting process, and the TUC accepted this compromise. While 
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many TUC activists, Communists and non-Communists alike, deplored the vetting 
program, there were also supporters. Arthur Deakin, Bevin’s successor at the 
Transport and General Workers, chided fellow trade unionists at the 1949 TUC 
Congress who worried that innocent civil servants would be caught up in vetting: 
“The people with whom we are concerned are those who become involved with 
Communists and are so tied up with them you cannot tell t’other to which. We have 
made it perfectly clear as a Congress from time to time that we are not prepared to 
offer any support to those who ask that the Government not take effective measures 
as are necessary to see that there is complete observance of anything involving the 
security of the State.”98  The TUC was as concerned to support the Labour 
government as its civil-service members.99 By 1949, in domestic affairs as in foreign, 
the Labour government and the TUC shifted back into the full-throated 
anticommunism of the pre-war years. 
*** 
What does this comparison tell us about the politics of anticommunism in the 
USA and the UK? As Marc Bloch observed, comparative history works best when it 
examines cases that are sufficiently close that difference does not overwhelm the 
analysis. Better to use “societies that are at once neighboring and contemporary, 
exercising a constant mutual influence, exposed throughout their development to 
the action of the same broad causes, and owing their existence in part to a common 
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origin.”100 The seeming parallels between the US and the UK—their shared Anglo-
American jurisprudential traditions, close political alliance in the 20th century, and 
apparent distance from the revolutions and counter-revolutions that characterized 
modern European politics—have led many contemporaries and observers to trace 
moments of divergence and convergence in their histories. McCarthyism is one of 
the sharpest of these moments. 
Historians have pointed to a range of factors that seemed to produce 
intolerance in the US and tolerance in the UK, from religious fundamentalism, 
populism, and nativism in the US, to working-class deference, the valorization of 
privacy, and the ruling-class solidarity.101 These explanations account for much, but 
they also threaten to make the outcome appear inevitable: McCarthyism and its 
absence can seem overdetermined. As Deborah Cohen has remarked, often “what 
comparisons illuminate are not hitherto unknown developments, but the 
significance of institutions and phenomena that national historians take for 
granted.”102 This account shows that trade unions deserve a more prominent role in 
the history of domestic anticommunism. Most histories, British or American, tend to 
treat trade unions as targets rather than authors of anticommunist ideologies and 
policies. As this article shows, however, in both countries the national labor 
federations developed anticommunist agendas according to logics internal to their 
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respective labor movements. The Cold War created a situation that magnified and 
amplified these dynamics, but it did not produce them.  
 This comparison yields a seemingly paradoxical result: it tells us more 
about the US than about the UK. Labor anticommunism was an independent political 
force in the US in the interwar period, and most effective at the end of the 1930s, 
when the testimony of union leaders helped create the rationale for new regimes of 
political policing. AFL leaders sought to inculcate anticommunism among their 
members and provided legitimacy for red-baiters like Martin Dies. The distinctive 
anticommunist repertoires that unions developed during the interwar years 
provided a resource on which Cold War politics could draw. In the UK, labor leaders, 
although also anticommunist by the early 1930s, were not particularly antagonistic 
toward communists within their unions, nor did they call for action against 
communists in the polity. Rather, the TUC voiced a form of reluctant toleration of 
communism that was characteristic of postwar Britain. This reluctant toleration was 
not unique to the TUC, however. It was voiced by the Labour Party as well. The TUC 
was in step with broader patterns of political toleration in Britain. Thus British labor 
anticommunism did not operate as an independent force, either accelerating or 
curbing anticommunist sentiment or repression. In the USA, by contrast, labor 
anticommunism was both a generative and a motive force.103 
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Politics mattered. Anticommunism and the forms that it took, including 
McCarthyism, were not inevitable outgrowths of preexisting political cultures; 
rather, those political cultures were made and remade through concerted political 
action. Understanding its origins in the labor movement helps explain why Cold War 
anticommunism often came dressed in a workingman’s cap. 
 
 
